Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Approach by Sillari, Giacomo
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Goldstone Research Unit Philosophy, Politics and Economics
3-2013
Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-
Theoretic Approach
Giacomo Sillari
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone
Part of the Epistemology Commons, Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Commons,
Metaphysics Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, and the Philosophy of Science
Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone/14
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sillari, G. (2013). Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Approach. Synthese, 190 (5), 871-890. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s11229-012-0190-z
Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Abstract
Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a
skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which
determines correctness conditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of?
Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions
sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea (cf. P.I. §§198, 199) that
a rule is followed insofar as a convention is in place. In particular, I consider the game-theoretic definition of
convention offered by David Lewis and I show that it illuminates essential aspects of the communitarian
understanding of rule-following.
Make the following experiment: say “It’s cold here” and mean “It’s warm here”. Can you do it?
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, §510.
I can’t say “it’s cold here” and mean “it’s warm here”—at least, not without a little help from my friends.
David Lewis, Convention.
Keywords
coordination, rule-following, convention, Wittgenstein, David Lewis, common knowledge
Disciplines
Epistemology | Logic and Foundations of Mathematics | Metaphysics | Philosophy of Language | Philosophy
of Science
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/goldstone/14
 1 
Rule-following as coordination: A game-theoretic approach 
Giacomo Sillari 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
Make the following experiment: say “It‟s cold here” and mean “It‟s warm here”. Can you do it? 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §510. 
 
I can‟t say “it‟s cold here” and mean “it‟s warm here”—at least, not without a little help from my friends. 
David Lewis, Convention. 
 
 
Abstract 
Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations 
describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox 
involves the element of the community, which determines correctness conditions for rule-
following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say 
that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions 
sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea (cf. 
P.I. §§ 198, 199) that a rule is followed insofar as a convention is in place. In particular, I 
consider the game-theoretic definition of convention offered by David Lewis and I show 
that it illuminates important elements of the communitarian understanding of rule-
following
1
. 
 
0. Introduction 
 
The slogan that “meaning is normative” (and the normativity of rule-following in 
general) is best understood in the context of strategic interaction in a community of 
                                                 
1
 Many thanks for useful commentaries and discussions to Peter Baumann, Cristina Bicchieri, Liz Camp, 
Ka-Yuan Cheng, Richard Eldridge, Francesco Guala, Simon Huttegger, Rohit Parikh, Jan Sprenger, Kevin 
Zollman, Brian Skyrms, and audiences at the 2008 Summer School Urrutia Elejalde on Social Norms, San 
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individuals. Famously, Kripke has argued in (Kripke 1982) that the central portion of the 
Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. 
Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines conditions 
of assertability in the language, and conditions of correctness for rule-following behavior. 
A battery of argument is used to argue that meaning (or, in general, rule-following) 
cannot be explained by resorting to an individual‟s mental states, or her past use, or her 
dispositions. By exclusion, this indicates that no descriptive fact is constitutive of 
meaning and that “meaning is normative” or, for the purpose and scope of this article, 
that rule-following is a normative notion. The normativity of rule-following is related to 
the correctness conditions that hold in a community. Indeed, membership in the 
community depends on one‟s record of compliance2 with the correctness conditions. But 
what do such conditions precisely consist of? How are they sustained in the community? 
And is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule-following
3
? 
 
The central thesis of this article is that the skeptical solution put forth by Kripke can be 
illuminated if looked at in the context of the strategic interaction taking place in a 
                                                 
Sebastian, the 31
st
 International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, Austria, the 83
rd
  meeting of the 
Pacific APA in Vancouver, Canada, the Philosophy Department at Swarthmore College and the 37
th
 
meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy in Alberta. 
2
 Cf. (Kripke 1982: 91-2): “Any individual who claims to have mastered the concept of addition will be 
judged by the community to have done so if his particular responses agree with those of the community in 
enough cases […] An individual who passes such tests is admitted in the community as an adder; an 
individual who passes such test in enough other cases is admitted as a normal speaker of the language and 
member of the community.” 
3
 While Kripke himself uses the terms meaning and rule-following rather interchangeably in (Kripke 1982), 
in some cases the two terms need not be equivalent. In the following, I tackle the issue of rule-following 
and of the nature of correctness conditions, leaving the analysis of meaning to a companion paper. 
 3 
community. Wittgenstein states that a rule can be followed only insofar as there is a 
habit, a social convention in place. Building on Wittgenstein‟s observation, we will read 
the skeptical paradox of the central portion of the Investigations, as well as Kripke‟s 
skeptical solution in light of David Lewis‟s definition of social convention in his seminal 
Convention: A Philosophical Study. Lewis offers his account in the context of the theory 
of games, as we do in this paper. The game-theoretic analysis allows us to better 
understand the role played by the community in the skeptical solution and, in particular, it 
will allow us to explain in greater detail the role played by some key notions in the 
Kripkean approach, as those of agreement, Lebensform and blind action.  
 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In section 1, I introduce Lewis‟s theory of 
convention and briefly discuss its normative content. In section 2, I address two 
objections to the opportunity of a Lewisian and game-theoretic approach to rule-
following. In section 3, I interpret Wittgensteinian rule-following in terms of Lewis-
conventions. In section 4, I discuss the relation of the notions of Lebensform and common 
knowledge, while section 5 will be concerned with Wittgensteinian blind action in the 
context of evolutionary game theory. 
 
1. Convention as Coordination 
 
 4 
Wittgenstein states (§§198, 199) that a rule is followed insofar as there exists a custom, a 
convention. Yet, as Bloor (1997: 27) points out, “[w]e need more than a generalized 
awareness of the importance of social processes: we need a specific understanding of 
what is meant by the word „institution4‟.” I claim in this paper that Lewis‟s game-
theoretical account of convention can answer such a need, and that in fact the idea of 
rule-following as participation in a social custom or institution is illuminated when 
looked at through the lens of David Lewis‟s theory of convention. Lewis argues in 
(Lewis 1969) that coordination games (situations of strategic interaction in which the 
interest of the players roughly coincide) underlie every instance of convention, in that a 
convention is a regularity in the solution (equilibrium) of recurrent coordination games. 
The agents participating in the convention conform to the regularity because they prefer 
conformity over non-conformity, conditional on other agents‟ conforming. They form the 
belief about other agents‟ conformity through some coordination device: explicitly—
through agreement—or tacitly—because a certain action stands out as the one that most 
                                                 
4
 Shortly thereafter, Bloor (ibidem) complains that “positive ideas on the subject has been conspicuous by 
their absence,” and proceeds to put forth his own positive notion of social institutions, drawing both from 
philosophy (Anscombe) and sociology (Barnes.) I‟m highly sympathetic to Bloor‟s view, in which a social 
institution is defined as a “collective pattern of self-referring activity” (Bloor 1997: 33). While Bloor 
approvingly mentions Lewis‟s formal rendition of the Humean account of social convention, he does not 
emphasize the strategic element inherent in social conventions—the game-theoretic idea that an agent (and 
indeed the whole community) is better off coordinating her behavior with that of others on the prevailing 
social convention. But it is precisely this material element that, as I shall argue throughout this paper, gives 
explanatory strength to the game-theoretic understanding of social institutions and in so doing clarifies the 
notion of the normativity of rules. 
 5 
likely (almost) everyone will pick. Such an action is salient
5
 to the parties. In the case of 
a recurrent coordination problem, a special kind of salience—precedent—is at play.  
 
For an instance of a coordination game involving salience as a coordination device, 
suppose that two friends are hiking a trail at a distance from one another. The first hiker 
reaches a bifurcation. She does not expect the hiker who is behind to be able to see which 
path she is going to take, hence she collects a few stones and sticks and improvises a 
signpost. The interest of the hikers coincides (they want to pick both the same path) and 
the situation is strategic, in that each hiker prefers one direction over another conditional 
on the choice of the other. The situation can be depicted by the following matrix in which 
the numbers in each cell correspond to the payoffs received by the players 
 
   II 
left right 
I left (1,1) (0,0) 
right (0,0) (1,1) 
 
The matrix represents the interaction described above, and inspection promptly reveals 
that it possesses two (pure
6
) equilibrium points (R,R and L,L), that is two combinations of 
                                                 
5
 The notion of focal point was introduced by Schelling (1960) as the explanation for successful 
coordination in informal experiments. 
 6 
actions such that in each of them no player has an interest to change her action. 
Coordination on one equilibrium point rather than another (in the example, R,R rather 
than L,L) is achieved by using the signpost as a coordination device, the salient 
equilibrium being the one obtainable by following the direction indicated by the hand of 
the signpost. We could stretch the example further and imagine that the two friends find 
themselves often in the situation just described. Instead of the elaborate signpost 
procedure, over time they could rely on more expedite mechanisms to achieve 
coordination. They may even simply rely on past coordination and always take the path 
to the right, which has become salient as a coordinative outcome because of precedent. It 
has become a regularity. 
 
Such a regularity, which in Lewis‟s account constitutes a convention7, is sufficient for 
some degree of normativity to arise
8
. Indeed, in a community in which a certain custom is 
                                                                                                                                                 
6
 The game also possesses a (weak) equilibrium in mixed strategies. In particular, if player I plays left and 
right with probability ½, then any action of player II nets player II the same payoff as any other action. 
Similarly for player II playing left and right with probability ½. Hence neither player has (in a weak sense) 
an interest to deviate from such randomized strategies. 
7
 Lewis‟s almost final (and sufficient for our purposes) definition of convention is the following (cf. Lewis 
1969:58): 
 
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a 
recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common 
knowledge in P that, in any instance of S among members of P, 
 
(1) everyone conforms to R; 
(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since R is a 
coordination problem and uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in 
S. 
 
 7 
in place—say, the custom of going by signposts—there is an equilibrium in the actions 
and beliefs of the agents involved such that the agents prefer conformity to the custom, 
provided that all other members in the community act according to the convention. If I do 
not go by sign-posts, or I go by them in a funny, abnormal way (for instance, going in the 
direction opposite to the one indicated, as mentioned, e.g., in §85) I act contrary both to 
my preferences—because I will not get where I intend to go—and to the preferences of 
other members of the community—because, say, I will end up being late, or not showing 
up at all. My reputation will suffer
9
. This indicates that, in general, parties to a 
convention feel the pressure to conform, to some degree. As Lewis puts it
10, “conventions 
                                                                                                                                                 
The notion of common knowledge was introduced in the philosophical literature by Lewis‟s essay. 
It indicates the state of affairs in which every agent in a group G of agents knows that p, everyone 
in G knows that everyone in G knows p, and so on. The notion of common knowledge has 
generated a vast literature in disparate fields, from logic to mathematics, to psychology and 
computer science. For a general overview, let me refer the interested reader to Vanderschraaf and 
Sillari (2007) and the references therein. 
8
 Approaching the issue of normativity of conventions from the other endpoint, Gibbard (1994: 98-99) 
says: “How, then, do I explain accepting a norm? I explain it by placing it in a speculative psychology. 
Accepting a norm, I hypothesize, is a state of mind that is linked to a special kind of linguistically infused 
motivation or tendency. The tendency, roughly, is to do what the norm says. The psychic mechanisms that 
underlie this state have as a chief biological function coordination through discussion---with coordination 
taken in the broad, game-theoretic sense expounded by Thomas Schelling (1960: ch. 2).” Similarly, 
Gibbard (1990: 64) states that “[s]ystems of normative control in human beings, I am suggesting, are 
adapted to achieve interpersonal coordination. What might this mean? To answer this I sketch work of 
Thomas Schelling on rational coordination in pursuit of human goals, and John Maynard Smith‟s 
evolutionary analog of Schelling‟s theory.” As Jason McKenzie Alexander (2008: 278) rightly points out, 
however, “[p]roblems of interpersonal coordination are certainly important for understanding human 
nature, but not all interpersonal decision problems are problems of coordination, even under the broad 
conception of coordination urged by Gibbard.” I will expand on this issue in the next section. 
9
 Thus, Lewis (1969: 99): “The poor opinion [other parties] will form of me, and their reproaches, 
punishment, and distrust are the unfavorable responses I have evoked by my failure to conform to the 
convention.” 
10
 But cf. Guala (2008) for a different interpretation of this quote. 
 8 
are a kind of social norms.” They have varying degrees of normative force, depending on 
how serious the consequences would be, were the convention to be broken
11
.  
 
2. Rules and Games 
 
Before defending the claim that rule-following in the sense of Wittgenstein is best 
understood as a regularity in the solution of coordination problems—that is, as a 
convention in the sense of Lewis—I need to answer two methodological objections. First, 
in Convention Lewis does take into account rules (cf. Lewis 1969: 100-107) to conclude 
that it would be difficult to single out a sense of the word “rule” that agrees with his 
definition of convention. Second, it may seem that by using Lewis‟s game-theoretic 
approach in interpreting Wittgenstein‟s rule-following considerations, I am endorsing the 
view that Wittgensteinian language-games could or even should be understood 
exclusively in the context of game theory, while such context appears to be much too 
narrow to accommodate the cluster concept of “language-game.” I respond to these 
objections below. 
 
                                                 
11
 Cristina Bicchieri (2006) distinguishes between conventions, descriptive and social norms. The 
distinction at work here is the one between descriptive and social norms. The dynamics of the (possible) 
acquisition of normative force by a descriptive norm is succinctly captured by Bicchieri (2006: 39): “what 
starts as a descriptive norm may in time become a stable social norm,” and more extensively analyzed in 
Bicchieri (1993: ch. 6). 
 9 
As for the first objection, Lewis points out in a section of Convention entitled “Rules” 
that “[w]e might be tempted to try distinguishing several senses on the word “rule,” 
hoping that one of them would agree with my definition of convention” adding 
immediately thereafter that, however, “I doubt that the project would succeed12.” This 
assessment follows the analysis of various circumstances indicating that in natural 
language there is no perfect overlap between so-called rules on the one hand and Lewis-
conventions on the other. In particular, while all instances of convention can be thought 
of as (informal, tacit, unwritten, etc
13.) rules, not all “so-called” rules can be thought of as 
conventions. For instance, there are rules enforced so forcefully that one has an incentive 
to abide by them regardless of the behavior of others, hence the element of coordination 
is lacking and we cannot properly speak of a convention in the sense of Lewis. There are 
norms issued by some authority or power such that one has an incentive to obey them 
unless everybody else disobeys. Since the incentive to follow the rule is (almost) 
unconditional, these rule do not qualify as conventions in the sense of Lewis either. There 
are social or political obligations whose underlying strategic interaction is best 
represented by games of cooperation rather than by games of coordination, and hence 
again they are not conventions in the sense of Lewis
14
. There are many so-called rules 
                                                 
12
 Cf. Lewis (1969: 105.) 
13
 Cf. Lewis (1969: 100, 105)  
14
 A game of cooperation is a strategic interaction in which the socially optimal outcome (in which the sum 
total of the payoffs is maximized) requires the cooperation of both players, while individual rationality 
pulls each player toward non-cooperative strategies, leading to suboptimal outcomes. The paradigmatic 
example of a game of cooperation is the prisoner‟s dilemma. Each player can “cooperate” or “defect”. 
From an individual player‟s point of view, the best outcome obtains when she defects while the other 
player cooperates; the second best when both players cooperate; the third best when both players defect and 
 10 
that do not necessarily presuppose an underlying game-theoretic structure at all: this is 
the case of maxims, generalizations, laws of nature, hypothetical imperatives, and so on. 
On the other hand, “[i]t is harder to argue that some conventions are not naturally called 
rules
15.” And indeed it is this direction of the relation between conventions and rules that 
interests us here. In fact, a different way to state the claim of this article is to say that 
Wittgensteinian rule-following deals with situations identifiable insofar as a there is a 
custom. Thus, while not all rules are interpretable as Lewis-conventions, all rules 
pertinent to Wittgensteinian rule-following
16
 involve a conventional element and hence 
can be analyzed as pertaining to situations in which individual preferences regarding their 
actions are conditional. Such situations are consistent with Lewis‟s analysis of 
convention in terms of coordination and in fact, as the rest of the article will show, are 
best understood as recurrent coordination problems. 
 
To respond to the second objection, notice that the question crucial to the framework of 
this article is the following: Are we entitled to cast the rule-following considerations in a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the worst outcome obtains when she cooperates while the other player defects. The need for a more 
expansive use of game theory in modeling social phenomena and conventions was very early recognized by 
Ullmann-Margalit (1976). In addition to coordination, Sugden (1986) makes essential use of cooperation 
and of several other game-theoretic tools in modeling rational social interactions. Binmore‟s complex and 
bold theory of justice and the social contract (1994, 1998, 2005) has both games of coordination and 
cooperation as its basic building blocks. In the words of Jason McKenzie Alexander (2008): “[t]he key to 
our moral nature, rather, lies in the fact that we all face repeated interpersonal decision problems—of many 
types—in socially structured environments.” 
15
 Cf. Lewis (1969: 104.) 
16
 Wittgenstein does not appear to be indiscriminate in his concerns with rules, cf. Zettel §320: “„cookery‟ 
is defined by its end, whereas „speaking‟ is not. […] You cook badly if you are guided in your cooking by 
rules other than the right ones; but if you follow other rules than those of chess, you are playing another 
game.” 
 11 
game-theoretic account of convention? Now, the multifarious abundance of the remarks 
constituting the Philosophical Investigations is notoriously unsystematic. The vagueness 
of the family-resemblance notion of language-game is lost in the exactness of the 
mathematical definition of a game. For example, the process of inventing and changing 
language-games is often mentioned in the Investigations, yet in the game-theoretic 
approach we consider pre-existing games whose structure does not change upon 
repetition. Moreover, some kinds of linguistic interactions that Wittgenstein subsumes 
under the family-resemblance notion of language-games can difficultly, if at all, be 
analyzed in game-theoretic terms. However, there is a similarity that criss-crosses and 
overlaps throughout the examples
17
 of §23 and elsewhere, and that is relevant to the 
game-theoretic interpretation I am proposing here. Most of the examples of language-
games in §23 and elsewhere in the Philosophical Investigations function when immersed 
in a strategic interactive context
18
. Let me use a few examples to illustrate the idea. First, 
consider “guessing riddles.” Guessing a riddle presupposes the existence of a framework 
in which an utterer uses a metaphoric and figurative language, or a pun, or semantical 
ambiguity to convey a definition through images that allow, roughly speaking, for a 
uniquely consistent semantical interpretation. Meanwhile, the audience attempts to 
                                                 
17
 Let me remind the reader of the variety of those examples: “Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements […] Reporting an event—Speculating 
about an event—Forming and testing a hypothesis […] —Singing catches—Guessing riddles—Making a 
joke; telling it” and so on. 
18
 If some (e.g. “singing catches”) seem to resist game-theoretical analysis, for other items in the list of §23 
a game-theoretic perspective sheds interesting light. Consider e.g. “[f]orming and testing a hypothesis.” 
Bicchieri (1988) explicitly analyzes rules of scientific methodology as Lewisian conventions. More 
recently, Zamora-Bonilla (1999, 2006) argues that game theory can be fruitfully applied to understand 
essential aspects of the scientific enterprise.  
 12 
produce such a unique consistent interpretation. One who is listening to a riddle (or 
reading it) and who does not understand it as the (ambiguous) definition of some thing or 
notion is equivocating and betraying the intentions of the author, and in so doing she 
makes the riddle, along with its meaning, vanish into thin air—or at least into 
uninteresting literal prose. Second, consider “reporting an event” and “speculating about 
an event.” Again, the function of the audience is essential: Suppose that the governor has 
been arrested today. “The governor was arrested on corruption charges” and “The 
governor is guilty of corruption” are successful instances of reporting and speculating on 
the event only insofar as the audience recognizes the former utterance as declarative and 
factual, and the latter as hypothetical and possible. If an audience mistakes “The governor 
is guilty of corruption” for a factual, declarative utterance, the mismatch between the 
utterer‟s and the audience‟s understanding of the linguistic exchange is such that it ceases 
to qualify as a “speculating on an event” language-game. Lastly, consider the famous 
“builder-assistant” example of a language-game (§2). Here the builder asks the assistant 
for the stones necessary to the construction; the builder calls, for instance, “slab!” or 
“beam!” and the assistant brings him a slab or a beam. In this interaction, the builder 
observes a state of affairs (lack of a slab, say), emits a corresponding signal (the call 
“slab!”), and the assistant performs a corresponding action (brings a slab.) The strategic 
component should be apparent: the interaction between the builder and the assistant is 
successful if and only if slabs are brought when slabs are needed, beams are brought 
when beams are needed, etc. Thus, for the assistant bringing a slab is the correct action 
 13 
given that the signal “slab!” has been sent to him because of a lack of slabs, and the 
signal “slab!” is the correct signal to send if bringing a slab is the assistant‟s correct 
response to it. This is in fact a problem of coordination of the same kind as those 
underlying Lewis‟s account of convention19. 
 
Even though the strategic element is essential for several instances of Wittgensteinian 
language-games, it remains true that large parts of the Wittgensteinian analysis are lost in 
a formal, game-theoretic account. For instance, the process of inventing and changing 
language-games is often mentioned in the Investigations, but in the game-theoretic 
approach we consider pre-existing games whose structure does not change upon 
repetition. As I have just pointed out, some kinds of linguistic interactions that 
Wittgenstein subsumes under the family-resemblance notion of language-games can 
difficultly, if at all, be analyzed in game-theoretic terms. It is no surprise that the „cluster-
concept‟ of language-game cannot be entirely covered by a game-theoretical account. As 
mentioned above, coverage is lost of some cases Wittgenstein draws our attention to. 
Other cases we can cover, losing some of details yet, to be sure, gaining in clarity. As I 
hope the rest of this paper will demonstrate, in a game-theoretic framework concepts that 
are key to the rule-following considerations can be more closely scrutinized and elements 
of the communitarian approach to rule-following better specified and illuminated. 
                                                 
19
 Cf. also §86, in which „tables‟ are imagined that serve the purpose of linking given signals to appropriate 
action, with different systems of „arrows‟ pointing from signals to actions emphasizing the arbitrariness of 
the interpretation of signals. In fact, the „table‟ and the „arrows‟ of §86 can be thought of as representing 
the „receiver‟ portion of a Lewis-signaling system. 
 14 
 
3. Rule-following as Coordination 
 
The crucial sections concerning the “paradox” of rule-following revolve around §201. In 
§198 it is clarified that interpreting a rule is not sufficient to show what an agent is to do 
in order to follow the rule. All interpretations “hang in the air” (§201), possibly 
contradicting one another. They seem to be conceptually closer to thinking that one is 
obeying the rule rather than to actually going by the rule (§202.) The relation between the 
expression of a rule and the agent‟s action is perhaps established by a learning process 
(§198), indicating not only
20
 that the connection between the expression of the rule and 
the action in accord to it is of a causal nature, but also that the existence of a convention 
is a necessary condition for the phenomenon of rule-following. 
 
Thus, when judging whether an agent adheres to a rule, we cannot base our evaluation on 
interpretations (be them the agent‟s, or ours) of the rule. Rather, we need to observe the 
agent‟s action—or, better, her interaction with others. While an agent‟s choice of action 
may remain in some instances the endpoint of an interpreting process
21
, action ceases to 
                                                 
20
 Following McDowell (1984: 360, n. 22,) I split the last paragraph of §198, assigning the first period to 
the interlocutor. Also, I take the “Nein; ich habe auch” of the last reply to the interlocutor as countering the 
“Aber damit hast du nur” (my emphases) in the interlocutor‟s line. Thus, the “nein” is not entirely 
adversative, but rather it can be read as “not only.” 
21
 However, the interpreting process cannot ultimately produce a justification for action. I shall say more 
about the issue of justification in the next section. 
 15 
be an interpretation and manifests the only instance of rule-understanding that is liable to 
verification
22
. 
 
In his skeptical solution, Kripke maintains that, while many interpretations of a given rule 
may arise, there is (roughly speaking) only one correct way to abide by the rule. The 
correct application of the rule is determined by the community. In particular, the 
customary action is the action that accurately corresponds to the rule. The agent is 
supposed to do “what he is inclined to do” (Kripke 1982: 88) and his action is then 
assessed against the background of community practice. So, there is no logical link 
between rule and action, but rather a psychological link, validated (or countered) by the 
customary practice that have place in the community. One problem with this solution is 
that the paradox suggesting the impossibility of solipsistic rule-following applies also to 
the community. How is the customary action determined? Why is it so defined? As in the 
solipsistic case, communitarian interpretations of the rule based on past use are no 
sufficient grounds to answer such questions, since the rule is susceptible of a multiplicity 
of interpretations also when the task of determining rule-obeying behavior is left to the 
community rather than to its individual members. Communal dispositions do not provide 
firmer grounds
23. Still, while “each of us […] calculates new addition problems, […] the 
                                                 
22
 Many agree on this matter, from both the individualistic and the communitarian sides: from the former, 
cf. for instance Baker and Hacker (1984;) from the latter, e.g., cf. Meredith William‟s argument about the 
primacy of action (Williams 1989: 183 ff.) 
23
 This is a major objection against the view involving community‟s inclinations or dispositions. It recurs in 
many arguments by individualistic critics. Kripke himself sharpens his position by pointing out that the 
 16 
community feels entitled to correct a deviant calculation” (Kripke 1982:111.) Where does 
such an entitlement come from? It is firmly grounded in the practice of the community, 
yet while Kripke (ibidem, 95-101) spells out the main ingredients of the skeptical solution 
(agreement, form of life and criteria,) it remains unclear why and how such elements 
succeed in bringing about a (practical) solution to the paradox. Again, it seems, no 
descriptive fact discriminates the practice of rule-following from failing to do so, and 
again we are lost in the “gulf between an order and its execution” (cf. §431).  
 
Meredith Williams (1989, esp. ch. 6) forcefully defends the community view by putting 
forth an original reading of the rule-following considerations that goes beyond both 
Kripke‟s skeptical solution and various versions of individualism, most notably Baker 
and Hacker‟s “rules as internal relations.” She stresses (Williams 1989: 169) that “[t]he 
normativity of rules is grounded in community agreement over time,” although (ibidem: 
177) “the community is not required in order to police the actions and judgments of all 
members, but in order to sustain the articulated structure within which understanding and 
                                                                                                                                                 
theory that one follows a rule insofar as she acts in the way most people in the community do “would be a 
social, or community-wide, version of the dispositional theory, and would be open to at least some of the 
same criticism as the original form.” (Kripke 1982: 111). Boghossian (1989: 173) criticizes communal 
dispositionalism as a solution of the skeptical paradox. Blackburn (1984: §3) focuses on a similar point to 
question the skeptical solution, cf., e.g., “[t]he community is as much at a loss to identify the fugitive fact 
as the individual was.” And, further on in the same section: “the skeptic who won against the private 
individual looks equally set to win against a community which has the benefit of mutual support.”  One of 
McGinn‟s (1984) arguments against the communitarian view is that, against what Wittgenstein says in the 
Investigations, it endorses the idea of rule-following as an interpretive process in which the interpretation is 
yielded by society rather than by the individual. If we cannot resort to a community‟s inclinations or 
disposition, then we need to look at the community‟s practice. I maintain that that is best done in the 
context of strategic interaction. 
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judging can occur and against which error and mistake can be discerned.” The articulated 
structure of society forces us to ask questions different from the ones made moot by the 
skeptical paradox. Not „what is the correct course of action with respect to a given rule?,‟ 
but rather „what is the connection between a given rule and action?‟ Not „what is the 
grammatically correct way to proceed?,‟ but rather „what grammar is immanent in our 
practices?‟ The community does not provide its members with standards against which 
they can evaluate whether actions are in accord or contrary to rules. However, the 
community is structured in a way that sustains constancy of practice over time, that is 
agreement in the way we (generally) follow rules. In this sense, society in its articulated 
structure does not police the actions of individuals—that is, does not say outright what 
course of action is correct with respect to a rule, checking the rule against a given 
standard—but merely sustains an immanent “grammar” of our societal practices—that is, 
creates conditions such that coordinative action can be performed. Can we say more 
about the articulated structure of society that is necessary to discern correct and incorrect 
applications of a rule? 
 
To answer this question, let me elaborate my reading of Wittgenstein following the sign-
post example. As I understand it, the rule-following phenomenon presented in the 
Philosophical Investigations can be analyzed in three elements: the expression of a rule, 
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the interpretation of a rule, and the actual rule-following
24
. Consider again the example of 
a signpost. Firstly, the expression of the rule is the physical instance of the sign-post. The 
sign-post is merely a piece of wood that “by itself seems dead.” (§432). The existence of 
a convention implies that a recurrent coordination game be recognizable. Thus, „going by 
a signpost‟ happens only insofar as a strategic interaction involving the use of signposts is 
recognizable. The expression of a rule (psychologically) determines the strategic 
interaction related to the rule. The expression of a rule makes it explicit that a strategic 
interaction is going to take place, and so, in a sense, we could say that it determines that 
there will be interacting agents. Secondly, agents interpret the rule. In the case of going 
by sign-posts, let us consider agents who have, for simplicity, two interpretations: going 
in the direction indicated by the arrow (say, right), or going in the opposite direction
25
. 
Recognizing the structure of the strategic interaction related to the expression of a rule 
pertains to the element of rule-interpretation, that is providing strategies on how to follow 
the rule. The skeptical paradox stems from the interpretations “hanging in the air along 
with what they interpret.” Thus, when interpreting a rule we come up with a series of 
possible actions (yielded by several of the vast number of possible interpretations). In the 
game-theoretic understanding of rule-following, each of the many interpretations of the 
expression is a possible action of the game induced by the rule. Even if we were to carry 
                                                 
24
 For a similar exegesis, cf. Arrington (2001). 
25
 Of course there is an infinite number of possible strategic interactions that can be associated with any 
rule-expression. This implies that the resulting coordination game is arbitrarily large. 
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out the interpretive process
26
 and decide that a certain action were the correct application 
of the rule, §202 reminds us that no action gains special support by any given 
interpretation, since thinking one is following a rule is not the same as following a rule. 
Thus, thirdly and lastly, the actual rule-following takes place only in the instant the agent 
actually moves away from the sign-post and goes right, or left. This phase represents the 
agent‟s non-interpretive grasp of the rule (§201) and constitutes the only portion of the 
process described here that can be evaluated. If the agents‟ choices strategically match 
the choice of other(s) and the profile of actions constitutes the regular solution 
(equilibrium) of the coordination game, then the agents are in fact following a rule and 
receiving a positive payoff. The following table is a synthesis of the three aspects of rule-
following, along with their game-theoretic counterparts: 
 
                                                 
26
 As we shall see more closely in the next section, precedent and strategic reasoning, pattern projection and 
common knowledge thereof may all be thought of as parts of a deliberation or of a justification that selects 
one action over another (say, going right rather than left.) It remains true that in actuality, deliberation and 
justification often leave place to automatic behaviors that are blind (§219) and without justification (§269.) 
This does not mean that deliberation and justification should not be part of the analysis, for, among others, 
the three reasons listed below. Firstly, there are cases of conventions that are yet not well established (that 
is, rules that preserve some ambiguity as to what the correct response might be), and hence leave room for 
thinking: coming up with an interpretation and deliberate whether our interpretation is correct. Since the 
context is interactive and strategic, an essential part of my deliberation will be my belief about your action, 
and my belief about your belief about my action, and so on (cf. passim, and Sillari 2005 for a discussion of 
higher-order iterated beliefs in the context of conventions). Secondly, there are cases in which a well-
established convention fails and the automatic action strikes trouble. In some of such cases, especially if 
recurrent, the agent will be interested in checking whether the action automatically performed matches the 
preferences and expectation that she may ascribe to other agents in the community. Thirdly, there are cases 
in which we are to evaluate the performance of others. To use the example of Brandom (1983: 643-645), 
the “parrot trained reliably to say „It‟s getting warmer‟ only as the temperature climbs past 80 degrees 
never succeeds in asserting that it is getting warmer”. Its behavior coordinates with ours, but does not 
match the preferences and expectations that can justify it. In conclusion, while conventional action and 
rule-following behavior is by and large an issue of automatic behavior (cf. Bicchieri 2006: ch. 2), a rational 
reconstruction of the system of preferences and beliefs involved in choice and motive is not unwarranted.  
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Expression    Interpretation   Action    
Recognizing a strategic  determining viable   material outcome 
interaction    actions       
(players)    (strategies)   (payoffs) 
 
I believe that the game-theoretic structure just described capture the essence of William‟s 
„articulated structure‟. In the game-theoretic context, community agreement is a special 
kind of agreement in preferences and beliefs that fulfills the definition of social 
convention. Agreement in preferences and beliefs (Williams‟s “harmony of society”) is 
not the same as a standard of correctness with respect to given rules, but represents the 
articulated—that is: strategic—setting in which and through which we can evaluate 
action. The strategic setting does not offer any way to extrapolate standards of 
correctness. It describes the social interaction that makes rule-following agents better off, 
hence sustaining the constancy of societal practice. It does not provide agents with 
written-in-stone standards about what they are to do, but makes sure that if they think 
others will perform action a in response to rule r, then they will be better off performing 
action a as well. Indeed, if we interpret rule-following as regular coordination 
equilibrium in recurrent coordination problems
27
, then there is a clear and compelling fact 
to the matter of what “going by the rule” consists of. In particular, individuals who go by 
                                                 
27
 Notice that I am not requiring, here, that the equilibrium be identifiable ex ante by members of the 
community. What needs to be recognized by the agents is that there is a strategic interaction in place. That 
is, the satisfaction of my preferences does not depend straightforwardly on my action, but also, and 
essentially, on what you are going to do. 
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the rule net a higher payoff than individuals who fail to obey the rule
28
. The mutually 
beneficial outcome is after all the purpose of the sign-post (thought of, a la Lewis, as a 
coordination device,) and in this sense we can say, with Wittgenstein (§87), that “[t]he 
sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose.” That is, if 
we manage to coordinate, perhaps even efficiently, our behavior. Moreover, even if the 
community, as Williams explains, need not police the activities of its members at all 
times, transgressing the rule may come at a price, both for the transgressor and for the 
agents who are interacting with him. Non-conformative behavior thus may in these cases 
end up being sanctioned (possibly and eventually with expulsion from the community), 
while conformative behavior perpetuates itself, since it is based on the agreement to act 
according to given rules. In this sense, agreement is the agreement in preferences and 
beliefs that support a specific equilibrium in the recurrent coordination game, while the 
normativity of rules may originates from it. 
 
Thus, the “little help” needed by Lewis from his friends in the answer to the challenge of 
§510 reported in the epigraph consists then in their agreeing to different preferences and 
                                                 
28
 Indeed it sometimes seems that critics of the communitarian solution neglect to consider the pragmatic 
consequences of rule-following, that is, in the game-theoretic setting I privilege here, the payoffs for 
coordinating behavior as opposed to the payoffs for failing to do so. As Rohit Parikh (2002) emphasizes, 
Wittgenstein himself does not always delve on the subject: for instance, in the famous “five apples” 
example of §1, the passing hands of money from the shopper to the shopkeeper is elegantly ignored. 
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beliefs, switching in so doing from one solution of a recurrent coordination game to 
another
29
. Consider §224: 
 
The word “agreement” and the word “rule” are related to one another, 
they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the 
use of the other with it. 
 
I believe that the view expressed in this section captures the sense in which “agreement” 
and “rule” are related: A custom—and hence a rule—does not hold without an agreement 
in preferences and beliefs—and hence in coordinative, conventional actions—on part of  
the members of the community. In other words, if an agreement is in place, parties to it 
now prefer to conform to the agreed upon behavior, and believe that all share such a 
preference (and belief). But mutual preferences and beliefs of this kind form a 
convention, which has some degree of normative force, hence is a rule. On the other 
hand, if a rule is in place, parties to it relinquish their unconditional preferences and 
conditionally prefer to conform to the rule. They do in fact have reason to conform 
insofar as they believe that others share such preferences and beliefs, i.e. insofar as an 
agreement, as described above, is in place. 
 
                                                 
29
 Hacker (1996: 201) points out that in an ironic context one does say “it‟s cold” to mean “it‟s very hot.” 
In fact, we can (crudely) game-theoretically account for irony using the following signaling system: player 
i feels cold, she ironically sends the signal “it‟s warm in here” expecting the audience to catch the irony and 
achieve coordination by shutting the window, rather than take the expression literally and fail to coordinate 
by bringing a sweater. The „ironic equilibrium‟ of this simple 2x2x2 signaling game lies with the anti-
signaling system (cf. Skyrms 1996: ch. 5) of the signaling game. 
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So, a rule is a mutual (tacit) agreement to act in accordance to a regularity of past 
behavior. The “paradox,” as the second half of §201 explains, turns out to be a 
misunderstanding: the myriad possible interpretations of the rule are eliminated by the 
existing institution, and we can say that an act is “obeying the rule” only with regard to 
the one action consistent with the existing regularity. But our approach, so far, has been 
descriptive: I argued that the social structure sustaining rule-following in the sense of 
Wittgenstein is a strategic structure sustaining coordination over time. What happens if 
the regularity in coordination is broken? The difficult question of justifying a 
coordination equilibrium arises, cf. §206: “Following a rule is analogous to obeying an 
order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one 
person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one 
is right?”  
 
4. Induction and Justification 
 
Consider again the example of coordination from section 1. The two friends have 
invariably managed to successfully coordinate on many instances, and once again during 
their hike they find themselves in the same coordination problem. Except that this time 
the leading hiker leaves a signpost indicating right and goes left. Their failure to 
coordinate reveals that, in a two-by-two interaction as the one we are considering here, 
one of the two, and only one of them, is not following the rule. But who is right?  
 24 
In the context of Lewis‟s theory of convention, the individual is right whose behavior 
conforms to precedent. Without reliance on precedent, no conventional strategic 
interaction in the sense of Lewis is possible and, as I have argued in the previous section, 
without the context of strategic interaction the community is in no better position than the 
individual in providing a determination as to which course of action is in accord with the 
rule. However, a skeptical paradox
30
 resurfaces in the game-theoretic account of 
convention. The paradox parallels the one identified by Kripke‟s in the Investigations. It 
is now yielded by the multiplicity of patterns that can be inductively projected from past 
conformity onto the coordination problem at hand. Thus, Lewis‟s answer that precedent 
works as a coordination device among the players has no teeth when considered by 
someone who remains sensitive to skeptical arguments, since the notion of precedent is 
susceptible to a multiplicity of interpretations just the same as the notion of rule is. In the 
more recent literature on this issue (cf. Skyrms 1996, Cubitt and Sugden 2003, Sillari 
2005, Rescoria 2007) two main stances on the issue emerge. Brian Skyrms, on the one 
hand, emphasizes that in the case of symmetric coordination games the emergence of a 
steady convention is a “moral certainty”, although which convention will emerge “is a 
matter of chance.” (Skyrms 1996: 93). We shall see the relevance of Skyrms‟s argument 
in the next section. Cubitt and Sugden, on the other hand, focus on the role of salience 
and inductive standards. For them, a given state of affair (history of past play) provides 
                                                 
30
 Cf. for instance the analysis in Cubitt and Sugden (2003: sections 6 and 7). The link between pattern-
projection in Lewis-convention and Wittgensteinian rule-following is highlighted also in Bardsley and 
Sugden (2006). 
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evidence from which players can extrapolate beliefs about future action. In particular, 
parties to a convention project a given pattern (call it precedent) because that pattern is 
salient to them. They are confident that (nearly) everyone is making the same inductive 
inference because inductive standards are shared in the population. The inductive 
reasoning based on precedent yields common knowledge (or, more precisely, common 
reason to believe) that parties to the convention will conform to it in the next instance of 
the coordination problem. Salience—that is, the inductive projectibility of a given pattern 
as precedent—generates the regularity that constitutes a Lewis-convention. In turn, 
conventions change over time, and our notion of salience changes with them. What 
counts as precedent today may not count as precedent tomorrow, when the current 
convention will have morphed into a different one. 
 
There is no deductive, infallible passage from past to future conformity, no “hardness of 
the logical must.” Rather, between the expression of a rule and the agent‟s action there is 
a causal connection. Such a connection may be based on training, as the interlocutor 
suggests in §198 (my emphasis): 
 
What sort of connexion is there here?—Well perhaps this one: I have been 
trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. 
[—]But that is only to give a causal connexion […] 
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Or it can be revealed through inductive reasoning, invoked within rule-following by the 
notion of convention and hence of precedent. Lewis was aware of the importance of 
inductive reasoning in his theory of convention
31
, and in describing the process that gives 
rise to the infinite series of replication of one‟s partner‟s expectations he notices that they 
need “mutual ascription of some common inductive standards and background 
information, rationality, mutual ascription of rationality, and so on
32.” Such inductive 
standards need to be common (and to be common knowledge as well) for Lewis‟s 
argument to go through. The commonality of our everyday inductive practice relies of the 
commonality of those standards, but there is no explanation available for the 
commonality of inductive standards. Similarly, Wittgenstein warns us that “the standard 
[of good grounds] has no grounds!” (§482.) It simply is the precondition of there being a 
certain language-game that we all share common standards, that we all use the same 
idiom of life rooted in our common Lebensform. 
 
These considerations suggest to understand the rich and profound notion of Lebensform 
as containing those grounding inductive standards that are a fundamental part of Lewisian 
conventions. Agreement in form of life then would entail agreement in inductive 
standards which in turn brings about agreement in beliefs, expectations and preferences 
about one another‟s conformity to precedent. The system of concordant beliefs about 
                                                 
31
 For a detailed formal reconstruction and discussion of the inductive processes implicit in Lewis‟s account 
of convention, cf. Cubitt and Sugden (2003). 
32
 Cf. Lewis (1969: 56-7.) 
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each other conformity—the strategic structure of society—inductively stem from the 
fundamental agreement in form of life. In turn, from our concordant beliefs and 
conditional preferences stem our conventions and customs, and our common knowledge 
thereof, hence our capacity to reach a consensus in actions, that is, to follow a rule.  
 
5. Precedent and Blind Action 
 
Perhaps common knowledge is not necessary at all in order to maintain a social 
convention, and the form of life can be shared by agents unaware of sharing it. A problem 
with this account is that inductive reasoning generates common knowledge which is, by 
itself, insufficient to provide a justification of conformative behavior. Indeed, as Margaret 
Gilbert tersely points out in (Gilbert 1990), in Lewis‟s account of convention practical 
rationality does not yield any justification to act in conformity to precedent. Common 
knowledge of rationality and of past conformity is insufficient to deductively establish 
conformity in the case at hand
33
. In a sense, the notion of precedent lies at bedrock, where 
the spade is turned (§ 217) and one acts blindly (§ 219) conforming to the convention and 
obeying the rule by habit, or because of a psychological tendency
34
 to be a „conformist‟. 
The connection between rule and action can become so entrenched to make rule-
following behavior automatic, blind. Wittgenstein speaks of “blind action,” Gilbert 
                                                 
33
 On the other hand, Weirich (2007) has recently argued that two rational agents playing a coordination 
game can bring about reasons to act coordinatively by forming foreseeable intentions to perform such acts. 
34
 On the tendency of agents` to be „conformist‟ in recurrent coordination games, cf. the fascinating 
conclusions drawn from experimental studies in Guala (2008). 
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speaks of an “a-rational tendency.” For McDowell (1984), understanding is precarious 
and contingent, for there is no guarantee that my current grasping of a concept will 
continue to function tomorrow as well
35
. Williams (1989:169) points out that once an 
individual has come to master a given rule, she has acquired a second nature, having 
reached bedrock and acting blindly without ultimate justification.  
 
In evolutionary game theory, rationality is an emergent property of the behavior of a-
rational individuals programmed to follow given strategies. In this sense, such models are 
well suited to account for Wittgensteinian blind action. In Skyrms‟s evolutionary 
approach, the emergence and sustenance of stable social conventions is guaranteed by the 
dynamics of the model. In this paragraph we offer a version of the argument to model 
Kripke‟s example of addition, developing the suggestion (cf. Skyrms 1996, ch. 5) that 
evolutionary models of convention can used to defuse the skeptical paradox. 
 
In evolutionary game theory, we consider a population of individuals. It is assumed that 
pairs of individuals meet at random and interact in a game. It is assumed also that each 
individual is “programmed” to choose a given strategy. Outcomes are assigned a payoff 
that represents not the utility, but rather the fitness received by each player. Individuals 
who net higher payoffs are more adaptive, and their proportion within the total population 
                                                 
35
 Cf. McDowell ([1984] 2002: 70): “at any time in the future my interlocutor‟s use of the expression in 
question may simply stop conforming to the pattern that I expect.” And, infra, “[m]y right to claim to 
understand him is precarious, in that nothing but a tissue of contingencies stands in the way of my losing 
it.” 
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will increase. The modeler then chooses a dynamics for the evolution of the population, 
and observes the behavior of the system. The replicator dynamics is often used, in which 
the growth of the subpopulation choosing, say, strategy S is relative to the difference 
between the fitness of S and the average fitness for the entire population. If the difference 
is positive, S entails an evolutionary advantage and number of individuals programmed to 
play S will proportionally increase. If the difference is negative, S is evolutionarily 
disadvantageous and the proportion of individuals playing S will decrease. The replicator 
dynamics is often used to model both genetic and cultural evolution, which is the one of 
interest here. 
 
What happens when a population of individuals finds itself interacting in the game of 
figure 1? The dynamics has three equilibrium points: one in which the entire population 
plays R, another in which the entire population plays L, and a third in which half of the 
population plays R and the other half plays L. The first two equilibria, however, are 
stable: if the system is perturbed by any small deviation (for instance, a random mutation, 
a mistake in performing a given action, etc.), the dynamics will promptly bring it back to 
the equilibrium. Consider the case in which the entire population plays L and suppose 
that a group of mutants plays R instead. Individuals playing L will almost invariably meet 
other individuals playing L (since by assumption almost the entire population is playing 
L, and matching is random), while seldom meeting individuals playing R. Similarly for 
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individuals playing R. But the payoff for (L,L) is 1, while the payoff for (R,L) is 0, 
therefore the difference between the fitness of those who play L and the average fitness of 
the population will be positive (albeit small if the perturbation of the equilibrium is also 
small), while the difference between the fitness of those individuals who play D and the 
average fitness for the population will be close to -1. Hence the replicator dynamics will 
reinstate the “all L” equilibrium when perturbed. Similarly, of course, for the “all R” 
equilibrium. The case of the equilibrium in which the population is evenly divided 
between R-players and L-players is different. Although it is an equilibrium (the difference 
between the fitness of individual strategies and the average fitness of the population is 0), 
it is not a stable equilibrium. If the proportion of individuals playing, say, L increases no 
matter how minimally, L  becomes more fit than R and the number of L-players will 
continue to grow until the entire population will be playing L. Similarly, the entire 
population will end up playing R if the unstable equilibrium is perturbed (it does not 
matter how much) towards R. “All L” has thus a basin of attraction (the states in which 
the dynamics leads towards “all L”) containing all states in which more than 50 of the 
population plays L and similarly for “all D”. We can illustrate this in the following 
diagram: 
 
All L  All R 
Figure 2 
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where the arrows indicate the direction of genetic drift and the unstable equilibrium point 
in which the population is divided equally between L-players and R-players is indicated 
by the symbol . 
 
Differential reproduction leads invariably to the fixation of a stable equilibrium, provided 
that we allow, as it is reasonable, for random small perturbations. In this kind of model, 
agents have no beliefs (nor of course common beliefs), they do not carry out any 
deductive or inductive reasoning, and hence it is not necessary that they share any 
inductive standard. Once the dynamics has established one of the equilibria as a 
convention, agents conform their behavior to precedent and the do so blindly. It is of 
course unreasonable to maintain that the idealized assumptions of the replicator dynamics 
are apt descriptions of human social behavior, yet these models show that using precedent 
as a coordination device can be justified by an evolutionary argument overriding the 
skeptical paradox—the salience of precedent is, as it were, naturalized, given that we are 
willing to accept the replicator dynamics with its assumptions as acceptable 
approximations of our cultural evolution
36
.  
 
Models based on the replicator dynamics are cogent when used to explain the emergence 
of a given behavior, once the material element inherent in social action is taken into 
                                                 
36
 Against this idea, cf. especially Sugden (2001). 
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account. Consider for instance the traditional example of quaddition
37
 from Kripke 
(1982). An agent who behaves as a quadder in a population of adders is not going to fare 
very well. On the other hand, a quadder in a population of quadders is not going to do as 
bad. A population of quadders, however, is arguably not going to do as well as a 
population of adders. The inability to perform additions more complex than 56 + 56 
would seriously hinder the potential for scientific and social progress of the population. A 
group of a few „mutant‟ adders will end up taking over a population made mostly of 
quadders
38
. 
 
Thus, if we represent „adding‟ and „quadding‟ behavior with A and Q respectively we 
have the following symmetric ranking of strategy profiles: (A,A) > (Q,Q) > (A,Q) = 
(Q,A), giving rise to the so-called hi-lo coordination game: 
 
 Add  Quadd 
 
Add  (99,99) (0,0) 
 
Quadd  (0,0)  (1,1) 
                                                 
37
 It is the famous rendition by Kripke of the skeptical paradox supposedly recoverable in the Investigations 
(cf. Kripke 1982:8-9): quaddition is an operation between two numbers x and y such that it yields as a 
result x+y if the two numbers are less than 57, and 5 otherwise. If an individual has never summed up 
numbers greater than 57, then the rules of addition and quaddition are practically indistinguishable, hence 
the skeptical paradox. 
38
 Someone could use considerations as this one to support an individualistic view of rules as based on an 
„internal grammar‟ (a la Backer and Hacker 1984). Of course—would the objector go—adders would take 
over a quadding society: after all, when it comes to adding numbers, adders are right and quadders are 
wrong. However, the reason why adders take over in the context of my argument has less to do with the 
fact that quadders are „wrong‟ than with the fact that quadders are worse off. Recall that, in fact, my 
considerations are made in the context of a skeptical solution. 
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Figure 3. 
 
The game is a coordination game of the same kind of the one introduced in section 1, 
except that here the payoff for coordination of the two pure strategy (A,A) and (Q,Q) 
equilibria differ. As in the game of section 1, the hi-lo game also has an equilibrium in 
mixed strategies. The probability of playing A in the mixed equilibrium depends on the 
size of the payoffs and in the game depicted in figure 3 is (.99 A; .01 Q). We can interpret 
the game as played among individuals in a population P, and analyze it evolutionarily. In 
the evolutionary analysis, we have two stable states corresponding to two (strict) pure 
strategy equilibria (A,A) and (Q,Q) of the hi-lo game. In such states, all individuals in P 
play A and Q, respectively. There also is one unstable state in which both A and Q are 
played, corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the hi-lo game. In this state 
1% of the population play Q while 99% of the population play A. Each stable state has a 
basin of attraction immediately to the left and right of the unstable equilibrium, as 
represented in the following diagram: 
 
All Q  All A 
Figure 4 
 
The basins meet at the mixed equilibrium point. Hence, the size of the basin of attraction 
of the inferior equilibrium (Q,Q) depends on the magnitude of the distance between the 
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fitness yielded by (A,A) and the fitness yielded by (Q,Q). If we assume that a population 
of quadders finds itself at a very strong disadvantage vis-à-vis a population of adders 
(that is, the payoff for (Q,Q) is much lower than the payoff for (A,A)), then the likelihood 
that quadders will take over the entire population remains low. Even though it is possible 
to imagine a community in which everyone is a quadder, it will however be precarious: a 
sufficiently strong perturbation can rather easily push the population in the basin of 
attraction of the more efficient adding equilibrium. If, as Skyrms points out
39
, in the case 
of symmetric coordination games as the one in figure 1 the emergence of a convention is 
a “moral certainty” yet which convention is selected remains largely a “matter of 
chance,” in the case of the hi-lo game, which captures essential features of the Kripkean 
example, chance plays a lesser role, since the basin of attraction of the efficient 
equilibrium is so much greater. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Game theory sheds new light on the notoriously obscure pages of the Investigations 
dealing with rule-following. Taking at face value Wittgenstein‟s indication that following 
a rule requires that a convention be in place, I have used David Lewis‟s game-theoretic 
account of convention to clarify how rule-following presupposes agreement an 
coordination in a community. In so doing, the role played by the community is made 
more perspicuous, and in particular we have seen that the strategic component is crucial 
                                                 
39
 Cf. Skyrms 1996:93. 
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of a full understanding of rule-following. Game theory and the Lewisian analysis of 
social conventions shed light also on two notions related to rule-following. The notion of 
Lebensform is illuminated if looked at next to the technical notion of common knowledge, 
and the notion blind action is clarified in the evolutionary approach. As I have already 
stated above, I am not claiming that game theory can cover all subtle nuances in 
Wittgenstein‟s notion of language-game, and neither I claim that hard interpretative 
issues (for instance that of solipsistic vs. communitarian reading of rule-following) can be 
settled by game theory once and for all. However, I do believe that I have singled out a 
group of notions in the Investigations which find precise counterparts in normal game-
theoretic ones. Finally, if my analysis does not of course purport to be historical in 
character, still it highlights that the later Wittgenstein already contains seeds of a 
philosophy of social sciences that has found voice first in David Lewis‟s seminal study 
and that, today, continues to grow at the intersection of philosophy and game theory. 
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